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Political Calculus in the Engagement with a Disaster Risk Reduction Agenda: 
The Case of the Post-2010 Earthquake and Tsunami in Chile 
______________________________________________________________     
 
Gabriela Hoberman, Ph.D. 
Disaster Risk Reduction Program 
Florida International University 
 
 
Local and national governments face important challenges when deciding to implement 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies in political and economic agendas. These constraints 
often include problematic flows of information and knowledge management, deficiencies in 
decision-making processes and a systemic lack of enforcement. Such conditions result in severe 
short and long-term implications for local and national authorities. This situation leads to a 
principal QR research question: Why do so few governments at any level engage in effective 
disaster risk reduction policies and programs? The current paper examines the situation 
following the Chilean earthquake and tsunami of February 2010, analyzing the impact of the 
event in engaging local and national authorities in a DRR agenda. The methodology for this 
research includes a collection of electronic media news on disaster risk reduction efforts carried 
by officeholders, following the February 27, 2010, event. Data will be gathered with a careful 
understanding of the ideological spread of media in Chile, gathering information from the main 
left, center, and right media outlets available. To complement this analysis, content analysis will 
be used to examine behavioral constraints, drivers, and incentives in order to explain why it is 
still challenging for officeholders to implement a DRR agenda for a post-disaster environment. 
This research is significant for both theoretical and practical reasons. First, it proposes a 
framework to examine and analyze the political and economic contexts; within the specific 
realities of disaster risk reduction. Second, it advances efforts to develop practical frameworks 
in the area of disaster research by looking at drivers and constraints for the successful 
development, implementation, and enforcement of a DRR agenda. Finally, if we consider that 
disaster risk reduction strategies are critical for reducing levels of vulnerability and risk –
focusing on susceptibility, exposure, and resilience—, engaging in a DRR agenda should become 
an unquestionable goal.  
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Introduction 
It has been widely acknowledged that disaster events pose significant challenges to all 
levels of government, including local, state and national levels. Such decisions have significant 
implications for decision making processes; as a result, they become overtly “political.”  
The political dimension of disasters has been broadly acknowledged by the literature on 
disasters (Cohen and Werker 2008; Olson 2000; Blaikie et al. 1994; Albala-Bertrand 1993; Cuny 
1983). Utilizing a political-economy model to examine at disaster prevention, Cohen and 
Werker (2008) noted that “natural disasters occur in a political space.”
1
 As such, the decision to 
engage in a DRR agenda appears to have the necessary incentives to carry out the relevant 
strategies in the aftermath of a disaster event. Yet, very few governments engage in a 
sustainable and effective disaster risk reduction strategy. It appears that government officials 
have scant incentives and few rewards with regard to public perception to warrant a 
sustainable commitment to a comprehensive DRR agenda. This assumption appears to hold 
true for both “catastrophic” events (e.g. Haiti’s earthquake) and “disaster events” (e.g., the 
earthquake and tsunami in Chile in 2010). 
Some answers to this shortcoming have been focused on stakeholders’ inability at the 
local, national, and international levels to convince government officials of the benefits of 
moving more to preparation and mitigation efforts to better overcome the effects of natural 
disasters. Other possible answers to this conundrum involve the need to shift our target for 
action, with more active participation of both the private sector and non-governmental 
organizations in DRR strategies. This study advocates for a broader understanding of disaster 
                                                          
1
 Charles Cohen and Eric D. Werker, “The Political Economy of “Natural” Disasters,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
52, no.6, December (2008), 795. 
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research, embracing a political economy framework, to analyze specific constraints and drivers 
of disaster risk reduction efforts as well as oversight and enforcement mechanisms. 
The paper focuses on the aftermath of the disaster event and reconstruction efforts of 
the Piñera administration with an emphasis on drivers, constraints, and incentives to embrace a 
DRR agenda and improve resilience in affected communities.   
 
Background about the Event 
Chile was struck with a devastating 8.8 magnitude (Mw) earthquake and tsunami at 3.34 
a.m. on February 27, 2010.  The earthquake was the second strongest earthquake to ever hit 
the country,
2
 and ranked among the top five worldwide events in terms of intensity.
3
 The 
epicenter was just off the coast of the Maule region, approximately 115 kilometers north-
northeast of Concepción, Chile’s second largest city. 
4
 This destructive event, affected 
Talcahuano, Arauco, Lota, Chiguayante, San Antonio and Cañete.
5
 In addition, an international 
alert was activated through the tsunami alert that involved 53 countries in the Pacific basin.  
The devastation in Chile was discussed in the National Reconstruction Program in 
Housing in the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (Government of Chile) report entitled “Chile 
Unido Reconstruye Mejor,” which described the extent and magnitude of the disaster event; 
Five cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 45 cities of more than 5,000 inhabitants, and 
                                                          
2
 The strongest earthquake ever registered corresponds to the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, also in Chile. 
3
 Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL). (2010). “Recomendaciones para una Estrategia de 
Reconstrucción y Recuperación del Terremoto de Chile del 27 de febrero de 2010,” United Nations, May 17, 2010, 
5. 
4
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5
 Ibid, 5-6 
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more than 900 rural and coastal communities were affected, with 90% of the destruction 
affecting “adobe-constructed” houses.
6
  
In the aftermath of the event, the national communication network ultimately 
collapsed, resulting in the exacerbation of the failure to coordinate the emergency response by 
national technical agencies and a deficient governmental response that set the pace for social 
unrest, which ultimately had to be controlled by the national armed forces. 
The disaster featured a historical political transition that shifted from the long-time 
governing party “the Concertación” to a marked economic-driven agenda promoted by 
incoming president Piñera. President Piñera was elected president as the head of the “Coalition 
for Change,” which united the center-right of the political spectrum in Chile. Piñera built his 
campaign to deal with the two major issues in the country: inequality and job creation. Yet, his 
agenda shifted inevitably to an urgent reconstruction effort after the massive disaster event 
that struck the country just days before his inauguration. 
 
Methodology 
The research question driving this study is: Why do so few governments at any level 
engage in effective disaster risk reduction policies and programs? This paper analyzes the 
impact of the studied event in engaging local and national government officials in a DRR agenda 
and examines why it is still challenging for officeholders to implement and enforce a DRR 
agenda in the aftermath of a disaster. 
                                                          
6
 Government of Chile, Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, “Chile Unido Reconstruye Mejor,” Plan de 
Reconstrucción MINVU, http://www.minvu.cl/opensite_20111122105648.aspx (accessed on February 15th, 2012) 
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This study utilizes a collection of print media from a diverse ideological spectrum that 
discussed the impacts and results of the earthquake and tsunami during the reconstruction 
process. Content analysis was utilized to determine the introduction of DRR efforts beyond 
immediate reconstruction and retrofitting to include a more comprehensive agenda deeply 
involved in a political economy approach, to understand and examine disaster events and deal 
with the incredible accumulation of disaster risk stemming from not only natural hazards, but 
also societies.  
Collected data included but were not limited to information from two of the major 
newspapers in Chile: El Mercurio and La Tercera, as well as other media sources. Content 
analysis was used to examine and analyze the data, supplemented by national and international 
institutional and technical reports on the reconstruction phase. 
 
Response Bias and Coordination Deficiencies  
Today, two years after the event, the Chilean earthquake and tsunami of 2010 was 
undoubtedly a devastating event. The 8.8 Mw earthquake and ensuing tsunami affected a 
range of 700 kilometers, with the regions of O’Higgins (VI), Maule (VII), and Bío-Bío (VIII) being 
the most affected. 
Hence, the Piñera’s administration, - in every effort to detach from the chaotic response 
that marked the disaster event around the tsunami alert and mainly the misunderstandings 
5 
 
between ONEMI
7
 and SHOA
8
 and the government’s ensuing response (or lack of response)-, 
framed his government as the “government of the reconstruction.”
9
  
During the event and its immediate aftermath, Bachelet’s administration encountered 
many challenges and critiques, especially with regard to the delay in the government’s initial 
response to the disaster event (both the earthquake and tsunami). In particular, controversy 
emerged about the lack of coordination between emergency response agencies and the 
reluctance to promptly allow the armed forces on the ground to control the situation. Members 
of Parliament also criticized the lack of effective national emergency plans, and pointed out 
serious deficiencies in inter-agency communication. 
The two institutions that shouldered the burden of criticism regarding the failures 
related to the tsunami alert were ONEMI and SHOA.
10
 According to the Attorney General’s 
office, no tsunami warning was issued in time to evacuate the affected areas. In addition, an 
alert that was subsequently issued was later deactivated and only re-activated when it was too 
late.
11
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 The National Emergency Office of the Ministry of Interior and Public Security is the technical agency of the 
Chilean state in charge of coordinating the National System of Civil Protection.  
8
 The SHOA is the Chilean Navy Hydrographic and Oceanographic Service. 
9
 Daniel Estrada, “Piñera ante el desafío de reconstruir,” IPS, http://ipsnoticias.net/nota.asp?idnews=94867 
(accessed on December 11, 2011) 
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 The critique mainly focused on how the tsunami alarm given by the PTWC center in Hawaii (3.48 a.m.) was 
disregarded by Chilean technical agencies; therefore, many lives were lost to the tsunami as people did not 
evacuate. See Paula Escobar Chavarría, “Two Years After 8.8 Earthquake in Chile: Lessons from a Disaster,” 
Huffington Post, Latino Politics, February 27, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paula-escobar-chavarria/the-
golden-era-of-mestizo_b_1277014.html, (accessed on February 27, 2012) 
11
 Denis McClean, “Chile Still Living with Quake Effects,” United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR), February 27, 2012, http://www.unisdr.org/archive/25366 (accessed on March 1, 2012) 
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 The lack of inter-agency coordination and communication ultimately led to the 
replacement of ONEMI’s director, Carmen Fernández, and the destitution of SHOA’s chief as 
well as the restructuration of its agency. 
Two years after the disaster event, prosecutor Solange Huerta continues to investigate, 
the negligence of government agencies (i.e. ONEMI and SHOA), and nine authorities will have 
to appear before the judicial system in 2012.
12
   
After the event, newspapers such as El Mercurio highlighted the structural failures of 
the Chilean state, such as the collapse of most of the country’s communication systems, lack of 
civil—military coordination, and delays in providing urgent assistance to affected communities. 
The event highlighted a series of misunderstandings between president Bachelet and the 
military officers in the immediate aftermath that is hard to overlook. The main critique was 
oriented at the lack of preventive and mitigation measures as well as a surprising delay in 
reaction by government authorities. One of the hypotheses raised at that time, asserted that 
the declaration of a state of catastrophe would hurt the image of outgoing president Bachelet. 
Others included that the government resisted granting the military the operative control of the 
impacted communities to avoid political costs in the final days of the Bachelet administration.  
Following the initial lack of inter-agency coordination in the aftermath of the event, a 
much broader discussion included the lack of experts and necessary equipment to engage in 
sustainable seismic awareness in Chile. The discussion revolved around the insufficient 
enforcement of the structural and seismic norms. In this regard, it is worth noting that nine 
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studies since 1999 have noted the need to follow a careful land use planning along with 
enforcement measures and oversight of construction practices in an unstable soil.
13
 
LAPOP’s
14
 study of the post-2010 earthquake and tsunami environment in Chile, as part 
of the study “Cultura Política de la Democracia en Chile, 2010,” found that the bulk of political 
responsibility for the response in the aftermath of the event fell to political and institutional 
actors. 
15
 However, all kinds of discrepancies arose between different government agencies 
(e.g. Moneda, ONEMI, Ministry of Interior); in addition, officials sought to treat both the 
earthquake and tsunami as a single event in regard to the victims.  
ONEMI, a unit within the Ministry of Interior with the responsibility to respond to 
national emergencies, was found to be especially ineffective in its handling of the aftermath.
16
 
Although no disaster event can be predicted with an exact date and time, and even 
when the country is often praised internationally for its level of preparation for seismic events, 
the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Chile proved to be extremely challenging not only for 
government agencies dealing with emergency response, but also for civil society who 
experienced a political transition that marked a profound ideological shift in the country. This 
transition implied the move from a longstanding political prevalence of “the Concertación” to a 
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 Patricio González, “Concepción. Nueve estudios advirtieron desde 1999 necesidad de subir exigencias 
constructivas en Constitución,” Terremoto en Chile 2010 – Archivo de prensa acerca del terremoto y 
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coalition of center-right forces that led to the election of president Piñera, featured by a center-
right oriented agenda. 
In the midst of this political transition, the effects of the disaster event rapidly 
uncovered. The failure in the early warning system as well as the evident lack of inter-agency 
coordination in the response led to a general discontent. In this climate, the weaknesses of the 
institutional framework and bureaucracy mechanisms became evident.  
 
The Government’s Reconstruction Plan 
Just twelve days after the earthquake struck Chile, Piñera was inaugurated as the new 
president. To detach his administration from the chaotic response that marked the disaster 
event, especially the misunderstandings between ONEMI and SHOA and the government’s 
ensuing response (or lack thereof), Piñera framed his government as the “government of the 
reconstruction.”
17
 
The new administration delineated a very ambitious plan that attempted to involve all 
sectors affected. However, the extent of the damages was not easy to address. 
At first glance, Piñera’s reconstruction plan appeared to be a well-designed 
comprehensive approach for dealing with the immediate disaster response and reconstruction, 
with critical sectors considered in a multi-sector agenda. The government was quick to launch 
its reconstruction plan, with specific timelines based on ensuring a clear-cut organizational 
structure and inter-agency coordination. Whereas Piñera’s administration claimed that a 
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 Daniel Estrada, “Piñera ante el desafío de reconstruir,” IPS, March 11, 2010, 
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reconstruction for such a disaster would require at least a decade, it established a timeline for a 
complete recovery and reconstruction within approximately four years. Acknowledging the 
total failures of the early warning system, the Piñera administration also proposed a major 
reform of the country’s early warning system, in consultation with other countries facing similar 
hazards. 
The government’s response can be assessed by looking at different stages within the 
recovery period. The first stage is the immediate emergency period, which usually implies the 
restoration of basic services (water, food, shelter, electricity), the restoration of public safety, 
and attention to victims. On several occasions the government expressed that these challenges 
were addressed during Piñera’s first thirty days in office.
18
 The second stage has been described 
by the government as the “winter emergency,” which focused on making 200,000 emergency 
shelters available before the winter season. The third stage focused on the health emergency 
system; the Piñera administration needed to deal with the damages and destruction of 79 
hospitals, as well as restore the private health sector system.
19
 
In reference to these three stages of analysis, the period of the immediate emergency 
was featured by the significance of the political transition and seriously affected by the evident 
failures of the early warning system. The second stage which referred to the “winter 
emergency,” became one of the most contested issues between the Piñera administration and 
the opposition. The government strategy in this regard has been widely criticized by the Chilean 
society, including major political actors, grassroots groups and opposition forces, who criticized 
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 The Brookings Institution, “After the Chilean Earthquake: Rebuilding our country better than it was before,” 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2010), 6. 
19
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the way in which government’s subsidies, did not translate into permanent and safer housing 
for the affected population. Two years after the event, this remains one of the main points of 
controversy. Finally, media analysis reveals a positive public perception regarding the third 
stage that aimed at restoring the public and private health systems. 
As previously mentioned in this paper, the main critics of the government’s handling of 
the reconstruction process have focused on its inability to provide permanent housing. The 
government, instead, emphasized the speed of the administration in restoring infrastructure 
and connectivity networks. On February 27, 2012, President Piñera affirmed that two thirds of 
the reconstruction has been completed, although hundreds of Chileans are still waiting for a 
permanent solution to the housing problem.
20
  
Representatives of the opposition parties, such as Osvaldo Andrade, president of the 
Socialist party, recognized the significant progress that has been made in certain affected areas 
during the reconstruction process, including ensuring and improving connectivity services, and 
infrastructure; however, he pointed out the need to speed up the process of housing solutions 
for displaced or affected communities.
21
 
Today, at two years after the devastating event, public perception of the disaster 
response and reconstruction is showing mixed reactions to the government’s plan. The effort 
has been widely criticized by opposition forces and civil society organizations in all stages of the 
                                                          
20
 La Tercera, “Piñera por aniversario 27/F: Nos hemos esforzado en reconstruir, porque sentimos que ese es 
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reconstruction plan focusing especially on the slowness of the process, the delay in providing 
permanent housing,
22
 the emphasis on subsidies instead of new infrastructure development, 
and the bias toward certain regions. 
 
A Narrow Focus on Disaster Events 
As we move forward into the twenty-first century, with increasing levels of vulnerability 
and exposure across regions, we realize that disasters need to be approached from a 
multidisciplinary agenda that includes a variety of actors and stakeholders. A post-event 
damage assessment is not sufficient if we are going to raise awareness about levels of risk 
facing affected communities. We need to work on how to identify and reduce disaster 
vulnerabilities while developing resilience in the disaster pre-event, calling attention to local, 
national, and international players in a sustainable DRR agenda.  
Indeed, disasters create significant economic burdens for affected communities; that 
require high-profile decision-making processes involving all levels (local, state, national), 
solutions or remediation of urgent social needs, and a reconfiguration of socioeconomic 
conditions to improve levels of resilience in disaster-prone areas. Consequently, there is an 
imperative need to change the lens through which we examine disasters.  
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 According to recent reports, the conundrum of how to solve the housing problem involves 220,000 houses that 
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In a recent study carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) on 
the political and behavioral effects of the mega-earthquake of February 27, 2010, the findings 
indicated that the greatest level of damage in neighborhoods corresponded to the seventh 
region (Maule, with 40% in average), followed by the eighth region (Bio-Bio, 29.9%) and the 
sixth region (O’Higgins, 29.3%).
23
 
Interestingly, this LAPOP study surveyed behavioral perceptions in regard to the 
possibility of a new earthquake in the future; -in a disaster-prone country—, historically 
affected by earthquakes and tsunamis. In a recoded scale ranging from 0 to 100,
24
 the findings 
revealed an average number of 68.2 for the variable assessing Chile’s potential to suffer 
another great earthquake, similar in magnitude to the disaster event of February 27, 2010.
25
 
It cannot be stressed enough how the media in Chile played a key role in setting the 
public agenda during the reconstruction process. The media predominantly engaged in 
addressing blame-assignment perception regarding the deficiencies of Chilean technical 
agencies in activating the tsunami alert system as well as a delay in the government’s 
declaration of state of emergency and decision to bring the armed forces into the response 
phase.
26
 In addition, discrepancies emerged between government institutions
27
 regarding the 
official death toll for the two events (earthquake and tsunami). Content analysis also revealed 
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 Richard S. Olson, Juan Pablo Sarmiento, and Gabriela Hoberman, "Disaster risk reduction, public accountability, 
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Reduction, (2010) UNISDR, Geneva, 19.  
27
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high-profile accusations related to the private housing sector
28
 and the failure of government 
agencies to appropriately enforce and regulate building standards and land use management 
plans. 
A few items did indicate positive public perception in the post-disaster event, including 
the system in place for seismic insurance coverage,-in which 1 in 5 homes have earthquake 
insurance—; the fact that all new mortgages require seismic insurance and the role of the 
armed forces once they were allowed to take control of affected communities.
29
 In regards to 
the identification of disaster risk in media coverage, few stories noted deficiencies in hazard 
identification and a lack of domestic experts. 
A narrow focus on disaster events has several implications that include a lost 
opportunity to generate consensus, improve levels of resilience in affected communities, and 
orient government efforts toward the reduction of risk and vulnerability. 
 
How to Engage in a Sustainable Disaster Risk Reduction Agenda? Drivers and Constraints 
Little doubt can be cast over the complex scenario Piñera had to face as Chile’s new 
president. He not only had to help the country through a major political transition that involved 
a redistribution of actors, interests, agendas, and public policy; but he also had to rapidly 
develop a plan to reconstruct a country devastated by a massive disaster event. In the 
aftermath, embracing a disaster risk reduction agenda seemed the “right thing to do” in a 
                                                          
28
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context of massive economic and social destruction that left the country with 562 deaths,
30
 
severely affected communities, and an incommensurable extent of damages across cities and 
towns throughout the country.  
If we are going to deal with a sustainable DRR agenda, it is of utmost importance to start 
by looking at how we define DRR, with a particular emphasis on vulnerability reduction, as: 
 “…a set of coherent and systematic actions designed to reduce the physical, economic, 
social, and environmental vulnerabilities of a given community or component part of a 
community to the particular hazard or hazards. More specifically, for a given community or 
component part of a community, DRR constitutes actions designed to reduce the probability 
that losses from its most likely hazard events would exceed the resources required for effective 
local coping.”
31
  
This definition emphasizes the need to work on vulnerability reduction, while promoting 
a comprehensive understanding of risk, as well as a multi-disciplinary focus on land use 
management, enforcement of building standards and codes, retrofitting vulnerable 
infrastructure, zoning, and sustainable environmental management. All these dimensions need 
to be taken into account when designing sustainable DRR strategies. It is worth mentioning that 
two years after the disaster event, it is not yet clear how the government restructured the early 
warning system for Chile. In addition, many civil society organizations still claim that the new 
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 EM-DAT, The International Disaster Database, Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters – CRED, 
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15 
 
Office of National Emergencies is far from becoming what the government promised in the 
immediate aftermath and does not show many differences from the former office. 
In a sustainable DRR agenda, the media certainly plays a critical role. After the disaster 
event, traditional media extensively covered the reconstruction period, while social media 
outlets proved significant for setting the tone and growing discontent about how the 
reconstruction phase developed. Civil society organizations as well as opposition parties 
accused the government of favoring certain communities over others, claiming that 
reconstruction efforts were not equally distributed across all affected communities. 
Participation at the local level has been a key driver of disaster risk reduction efforts. 
Without a clear understanding that the community has a determinant role in putting these 
strategies in motion, a sustainable DRR agenda cannot be warranted. The centralization of the 
decision-making process in Chile represented a severe constraint for the design first, and then, 
the sustainability of a national effort aimed at reducing levels of risk with a multi-disciplinary 
focus. In addition, this particular issue has received a lot of negative attention by the national 
media, in which the main complaints referred to the lack of mechanisms to ensure local 
participation, a highly centralized decision-making process in regard to reconstruction efforts, 
and an utmost lack of interest in generate consensus among affected communities. Blaikie et al. 
have noted how people working on reconstruction efforts have emphasized the need to move 
beyond the more visible rebuilding of physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc) by creating 
16 
 
what they have called ‘enabling structures’ that advocate for the promotion of confidence and 
trust, rehabilitation of industries, and possible changes in landownership patterns.
32
 
When examining incentives for embracing a political economy framework to analyze 
disasters with a DRR agenda, it cannot be overstated how incentives for action (or inaction) of 
government officials are clearly related to the extent of the consequences of a disaster event in 
regards to mitigation and preparedness efforts. Inherent problems in generating incentives for 
governments to invest in mitigation efforts have been identified in the literature on disasters. 
For example, humanitarian relief efforts often aim at addressing loopholes in government 
underinvestment in preparation measures. As Congleton (2006) notes, public policy and 
incentives are clearly interrelated with regard to the selection of building places, types of 
construction or design, and how infrastructure can work toward increasing or reducing risk.
33
 
In analyzing the relationship between globalization and the political economy of 
disasters, Oliver-Smith (2009) underscores that, in current disasters, it is important to identify 
and implement feasible elements of the reconstruction process aimed at reducing 
environmental degradation and hazards’ vulnerability “within the limits of action permitted by 
existing political economy structures.”
34
 
Adopting a more detailed risk management framework after Chile’s earthquake and 
tsunami, it becomes evident that the disaster involved a significant “response bias” in regards 
to the whole post-emergency system (including but not limited to civil, technical, rescue, and 
                                                          
32
 Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis and Ben Wisner. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and 
Disasters. (New York: Routledge, 2001), 216. 
33
 Roger Congleton, “The Story of Katrina: New Orleans and the Political Economy of Catastrophe,” Public Choice, 
127 (2006): 5-30, 6. 
34
 Anthony Oliver-Smith, “Anthropology and the Political Economy of Disasters” in ed. Eric C. Jones, and Arthur D. 
Murphy, The Political Economy of Hazards and Disasters (Plymouth: UK, Altamira Press, 2009), 24. 
17 
 
military agencies involved), with scant attention paid to risk identification and reduction 
issues.
35
 
Although the literature has extensively noted how disasters rapidly become political, in 
the case of Chile’s 2010 earthquake and tsunami, the political nature of disasters cannot be 
overstated as the event took center stage in the midst of a presidential inauguration, with a 
new ideological tincture that would set the template for the response, recovery, and 
reconstruction processes. Furthermore, the varied dimensions interwoven into a post-disaster 
reconstruction process, included: social, economic, institutional political, and environmental 
issues.  
Even considering that the impact of the disaster event transcended all efforts to provide 
rapid assistance, the Piñera administration has been widely criticized for its reconstruction 
process,- not only by opposition parties, but also by communities who felt betrayed by 
government officials’ broken promises. Piñera delineated a very ambitious agenda that lost 
momentum after the first few months of application. As a result, communities were left with a 
slow, deficient, and often fragmented reconstruction process. 
 
Moving to Resilience 
In a seismic-prone country such as Chile, the need to develop more resilient cities is 
undeniable. Natural hazards will undoubtedly continue to pose significant burdens for disaster-
prone countries. The issue of resilience is highly related to the concept of vulnerability. The 
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literature indicates that events such as the Indian Tsunami (in 2004) and Hurricane Katrina (in 
2005) as well as the increasing trend of global warming have demonstrated that communities 
are more vulnerable to natural hazards (Mayunga, 2007). Mayunga defines community disaster 
resilience as “the capacity or ability of a community to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover quickly from impacts of disaster.”
36
 Thus, the question is, are we doing enough to 
prepare for disaster events? If so, why are the losses so high? How can a move to resilience 
help diminish the great losses of human lives and property?  
The emphasis on building resilience in disaster-stricken communities has been growing 
over the last years. When dealing with resilience, we need to look into the concepts of 
susceptibility and exposure. Exposure or physical fragility has been defined as “the 
susceptibility of a human settlement to be affected by a dangerous phenomenon due to its 
location in the area of influence of the phenomenon and lack of physical resistance.”
37
 In the 
same line, the ISDR (UN) defined in 2009, the concept of exposure as “people, property, 
systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential 
losses.”
38
  
In light of inevitable impacts of natural hazard, more and more, the literature noted the 
need to focus on disaster risk reduction efforts and improving levels of resilience in vulnerable 
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communities. The notion of resilience is related to the capability of “bouncing back” and 
quickly” to restore to a pre-disaster situation. Therefore, the notion of resilience is clearly 
oriented to two main goals: the capacity of local communities to “recover” from the disaster 
event; and the ability to do it in a timely manner, in which basic services are “restored” to allow 
the community to continue functioning.  
Although this paper tackles the engagement with a DRR strategy during the post-
reconstruction effort in Chile, it is impossible to overlook the uneasiness that this process along 
with persistent socioeconomic conditions has created in the Chilean society. The Piñera 
administration has struggled to overcome the growing inequality in the country. This sentiment 
has duplicated in several regions, communities, and towns. The slow pace of the reconstruction 
process as well as its internal inconsistencies has certainly exacerbated these feelings, with 
many sectors of the population that feel are not taking part of a participatory process that 
allows them to shape the public agenda. The massive earthquake and tsunami of 2010 left a 
path of destruction of small communities, villages, and towns that witnessed not only the loss 
of their relatives and assets but also the disappearance of economic activities that used to 
sustain them. The government in that socioeconomic context, proved unable to revert this 
process in many of these affected communities, which up to date, are left on their own.  
The lack of community resilience, where the attempts to “quickly bounce back” prove 
unsuccessful is an issue of serious consideration. Decade after decade, we are confronted with 
the fact that disasters will continue to affect vulnerable communities that carry high levels of 
risk and exposure. Natural hazards will continue to pose a huge burden for communities. 
Despite knowledge about how human behavior can and often do accentuate risk-, communities 
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are increasingly failing to control population growth, or increasing levels of exposure and 
vulnerability, while they lack appropriate mechanisms to implement and enforce land use 
management plans and building codes. It is certainly the time to change the way in which we 
perceive disasters and realize that, in the wake of multi-hazard scenarios, prevention and 
mitigation efforts are necessary but not sufficient to develop a disaster risk reduction strategy.  
The earthquake and tsunami in Chile left the country in an extremely difficult situation 
from which it has struggled to recover. Even considering that the tsunami was triggered by the 
earthquake, it is still remarkable how the two events reflected two different illustrations of the 
country’s capabilities. Indeed, despite significant damage in various cities, the earthquake 
reminded the world of Chile’s level of development and effective building standards in place 
which enabled the country to avoid an even greater catastrophe. However, the ensuing 
tsunami, uncovered a deficient coordination among technical offices, highlighting the complete 
failure of the early warning system, and the lack of resources for appropriately maintaining the 
systems in place. 
 
Conclusions 
Although there seems to be widespread consensus on the need to work on disaster risk 
reduction efforts to mitigate or prevent the effects of natural hazards, governments and the 
private sector still find it difficult to justify expenditures on risk mitigation and preparation 
within their budgets. At this point, is disaster risk reduction a lost case? Is it only a question of 
incentives or just an obvious solution to an ancient problem? 
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The identification of risk is clearly one of the most important areas that need further 
improvement and development in order to move toward a more sustainable disaster risk 
reduction strategy. The growing pace of climate change and its slow but steady impact on 
natural hazards is only a preview of the kind of burden that natural hazards may pose in the 
future on disaster-prone communities.  
 Ultimately, the shift toward a sustainable disaster risk reduction strategy aimed at 
generating disaster-resilient communities is not at all a “government only” jurisdiction. If this 
kind of strategy is going to be put in place, its sustainability will not be warranted without the 
multi-sectorial involvement of actors including the private sector, non-governmental 
institutions, civil society organizations, and the international community. Although this 
argument may sound too ambitious, decades of risk accumulation, indifference, and apathy 
toward risk and its immediate, mediate, and long-term consequences, leave no room for 
further inaction. 
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